The Procedure
IYF normally begin s with hyperstimulation of the ovaries of an infertile woman (or an egg donor) by a series of drug and hormone injection s to mature multiple eggs within her ovary. At the end of this period, the eggs are harvested, usually by in se rtion of a hollow needle through the vaginal wall to the ovary. Nationwide, the average number of eggs retrieved is about 12 per cycle. ]
The sperm for IYF are usually obtained from the woman ' s partner or a sperm donor by masturbation and then capacitated for fertilization. Sperm and eggs are placed togethe r in a culture medium to achieve fertilization , and the res ulting embryos are grown for about 40 hours prior to tran sferal to the woman ' s uterus.
In cases of mal e infertility, the sperm may need some help to penetrate the egg. One way of circumventing thi s difficulty is to modify the zona pellucida or partially di ssecting it. A second so lution is intracytoplasmic sperm injection (I CS I) . In ICSI, penetration of the egg by the sperm is simply by passed ; a s in g le sperm is directly inj ec ted into the interior o f the egg. As in other in vitro methods, e mbryos a re cultured briefly prior to re inserti o n.
After the culture period, embryos are g raded based o n the ir shape and how well their cells are di v iding. To increase th e chances of a successful pregnancy, about four o f th e hea lthi est embryos are tran s ferred to the uteru s of the biological mother or surrogate . A study of 267 IVF program s in the US and Canada reveal ed a clinical pregnancy rate of 19.8% per cycle, with a delivery rate of 16.0% per cycle.' A Be lgian gro up has reported comparable rates of success fo r ICSI. 4
Church Teaching on IYF and Related Procedures
Fundamental to any und ersta ndin g of the Catholic C hurch ' s teaching o n IYF is that procreati on is exactly that: pro-creation. The tran smission of life is a n area in which man cooperates with God in the creation o f new life; it is not an area over which God has given man unlimited do minion . The dignity of procreation li es in th e fact that man cooperates with God in God ' s creation of a new human be ing, for whom God wills eternal life . " Human proc reation requires o n th e pa rt of thc spo uses responsible collaboration with the fruitful love of God ." s Such collaboration invo lves res pect for the nature of the conjugal act as God has a utho red it. Po pe Paul VI's encyclical Humanae Vitae remain s the key source for understandin g the nature of thi s act. T hi s e ncyc lical points o ut th e " inseparable connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on hi s ow n initiative, between th e two meanin gs of th e conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meanin g. ,·6 Of itself, thi s state ment is not quite sufficient to establish th e immorality of IVF . For one could argue, as does William Daniel. S.1., that all we learn from Humanae Vitae is that when the conjugal union is present, it mu st be both unitive and o rdered to proc reati o n. In th e case of IYF, however, there is no act of conjugal union, a nd thu s, it could be argued , no que stion of separating its two mea nings. 7 To clarify matters, it is necessa ry to read Humanae Vitae together with Donum Vitae, th e 1988 docume nt from the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Fa ith whic h addressed IY F directly . In thi s statement, th e Congregati o n states th at not o nly a re th e procreative and uniti ve meanin gs of the conjuga l act in separab le, but proc reatio n is in separable fro m the conjuga l act. Concepti o n in v itro is immoral because it is " the resul t of tec hnica l actio n w hi ch pres ides ove r fe rtilizati on. Such fertili zati o n is neither in fact ac hi eved no r pos iti ve ly w illed as the ex press io n and fruit of a specific ac t of conju ga l unio n."g Thi s statement po ints to the bas ic reason w hy IY F is w rong. It replaces the conjugal act, the o nly prope r context fo r procreatio n, wi th a tec hni cal procedure . Thu s, of its nature, IY F differs from othe r techni q ues w hi ch ass ist fe rtili zation . Donum Vitae explicitly makes thi s di stincti o n : " If the techni cal means fac ilitates the co njugal act o r he lps it to reach its natura l o bj ectives, it can be mo ra lly acce pta bl e. I f, o n th e othe r hand, th e procedure were to replace the conjuga l act, it is mo ra lly illi c it. ,,9
In iso latin g procreatio n from conjuga l uni o n, IY F tra nsfers the ca usa lity of concepti o n to the ha nd s of tec hni c ia ns. T hi s di sto rts not o nly th e pro per ro le of sex ua lity but a lso th e pro pe r ro le of the phys ic ia n, w ho is the n in vested w ith power over life and death . "The doctor is at the serv ice of pe rsons and of huma n proc reati o n. He does not have the a uthority to di spose of the m a nd to dec ide th e ir fa te." 'o Domlln Vitae has mo re stro ng wo rd s fo r the process of hetero logous a rtifi c ia l fe rtili zation, in w hich embryos are co nce ived by th e use of gametes from at least o ne pe rso n o th e r tha n the spo uses: " Th e fid e li ty of th e spo uses in the un ity of ma rri age invo lves rec iprocal respect of the ir ri g ht to beco me a fa th e r and a moth e r o nl y thro ug h eac h othe r. " " The Cong regatio n in s ists that hetero logo us a rtifi c ia l fertili zati o n is detrimental to the c hil d, w ho " can di scove r hi s ow n ide ntity a nd ac hi eve hi s own prope r huma n deve lo pme nt : o nly throug h a " sec ure a nd recogni zed re lati o nship to hi s own pare nts." I?
Cata ldo o utlin es two c urre nts of contempo rary th ought whi ch do min ate c ultura l views of IY F: perso na l aut o no my a nd e mo ti vism . He li sts severa l ethi ca l think ta nk s w hi c h appea l primar il y to the prin c ipl e of a uto no my in ma king mo ra l dete rmin ati o ns abo ut reprod ucti ve techno log ies, in c ludin g th e Ca nadi a n Royal Co mmi ss io n o n New Re producti ve Tec hn o log ies, T he Dani sh Co un c il o n Ethi cs, the U.S . Congress O ffic e of Tec hn o logy Assess me nt, and the Amer ica n Fertility Soc iety. Acco rdin g to th e pe rso na l a uto no my mind set, o ne is free to ma ke hi s o r he r ow n ethi ca l dete rmin atio n of these procedures and to use w hatever see ms appro priate . A ny no rm s th at wo uld di sco unt re producti ve tec hn o log ies pl ace a limit o n pe rsona I freedo m .
T he other stra in of conte mpo ra ry th o ug ht high li g hted by Cata ldo is e mo ti v is m . A good example of an emoti vist prese ntati o n of IYF is a maj o r periodical ' s recent account of the birth of quadruplets to a 48 year-old woman using her 28 year-old s ister ' s donated egg cells. The overjoyed mother views the future of the quads optimistically: "They're going to grow up in a caring environment with two parents who love them, not to mention one wonderful aunt."" Not surprisingly, no mention is made of any arguments against IYF, nor the ambiguity of which woman is the loving mother and which is the wonderful aunt.
More serious argumentation in favor of IYF from within the field of moral theology goes beyond personal autonomy and emotivism. Any case made in favor of IYF must accomplish two things : I) it must disavow the necessary connection between procreation and the conjugal act; and 2) it must provide a rationale for creating and destroying the " spare" embryos that IYF requires for success .
Some theologians attempt to accomplish the first of these aims by reference to the principle of totality. They admit that there must be some connection between procreation and marital union , but deny that each and every instance of proc reation must take place within the context of a conjugal act.
For example, Lisa Cahill remarks, " In homologous techniques, the physical relation ship of sexual intimacy, and the biological relationship of parenthood are both preserved within the marital relation of the couple.,, 14 Cahill shares the mistake of some defenders of the "fundamental option" theory by assuming that an association between the conjugal act and procreation can exist on a tran sce ndental level , i.e., on the level of " relationship" rather than particular acts. On the contrary, actions speak louder than words. Any recognition by the couple of the link between conjugal union and procreation must be spoken with actions that do not separate the two.
Objective #2 above is usually accomplished by questioning the perso nhood of the early embryo. Currently, such arguments use certain facts of developmental biology in an effort to show that a newly conceived human zygote is not, or is probably not, suitable material for a principle of perso nhood , i.e., a sou l. Among theologian s who hold this position are Norman Ford, 15 Thomas Shannon, 16 and Richard McCormick . 17 How do these theologians assail the personhood of the early embryo? One way is by questioning the early embryo 's individuality . According to these authors, the early embryo is in some ways more like a collection of cells than an individual human being. This is evidenced by the fact that each of the cells of the early embryo is totipotent, or able to develop into a new embryo if it becomes se parated from the rest of the cell mass. Such separation occurs naturally in at least one-fourth of one percent of pregnancies, resulting in multiple births. 18 Because of the questionable stability of the early embryo, Ford, Shannon, and McCormick draw a distinction between the kind of individuality that the early embryo possesses and the sort possessed by the later embryo or adult. According to McCormick, the zygote possesses "genetic individuality" from fertilization . In other words, it contains a unique genetic code different from each parent and from anyone else who has ever existed . However, as long as the embryo' s cells are totipotent, it has not yet attained " developmental individuality," i.e., it is not yet determined to produce one and only one human being. 19 
Is developmental
individuality necessary for personhood? McCormick answers affirmatively, because incommunicability is a defining note of personhood. If a single embryo is capable of developing into twins, how can the original embryo be held to possess an incommunicable principle of personhood, i.e., a soul?
Such arguments against the personhood of the embryo are far from unassailable. The movement from the premise that the early embryo can twin to the conclusion that the embryo cannot be a person is rather swift. Ashley suggests an alternative scenario by which an embryo that gives rise to twins could nonetheless be a person: the newly-formed twin receives a soul upon separation from the embryo?O Moraczewski suggests as less likely another hypothesis: the original zygote effectively dies, giving rise to two new individuals. 21 The position of McCormick, Shannon, and others can also be critiqued on the level of biology. There are many cases in nature in which one individual of a species divides to form two individuals, yet no one seriously denies that the original individual was fully an individual. Also, if the embryo is really a collection of cell s lacking stability, what accounts for the fact that twinning does not occur 99% of the time?
In the end, scientific data are necessary but not sufficient to answer the question of the early embryo' s personhood. Certainty regarding the personal dignity of the early embryo can be derived only from the awareness that "the gift of truth" has been entrusted to the teaching Church. However, the foregoing should be sufficient to illustrate that the personhood of the early embryo is rationally defen sible despite current claims to the contrary.
Some Odd Consequences
Part of the difficulty involved in driving home the immorality of IYF involves the consequentialist climate in which moral decisions are often made . As a previously cited example illustrates, the popular media often depicts happy outcomes of IYF without reference to its bad consequences, November, 1999 leaving many wondering what harm there could possibly be in the procedure. Without capitulating to consequential ism, it is worthwhile to examine some of these harmful effects, since bad effects are always the fruit of bad actions. What are some consequences of IYF other than those usually mentioned?
The first to be considered is the killing and miscarriage of "spare" embryos. Typically, technicians attempt to fertilize 12 eggs and implant four of them. Other viable embryos are then frozen , killed, or used for research. As an example, M.M. Bodin relates that after hyperstimulation of her ovaries, an infertility clinic harvested 15 eggs. Upon fertilization in vitro with her husband ' s sperm, doctors informed her that they had produced II viable embryos. They transferred six of the embryos to Bodin ' s uterus and froze the other five , but all six of the transferred embryos died. The five frozen embryos were then thawed for a second attempt, but only two of these survived the thawing process and these also failed to implant.
Two years later Bodin made another attempt at IYF. This try was " successful" and she gave birth nine months later. Technicians also froze 18 spare embryos from this attempt. Approximately one year later she felt ready for another pregnancy, so she had 12 of these 18 embryos thawed . Six were killed during the thawing process, and doctors transferred the other six to her womb, resulting in the birth oftwins. 22 Thus, in giving birth to her three children, the " side effect" was 21 dead embryos, not counting the six that are still frozen , and any others that never made it out of the petri dish.
As Donum Vitae remarks, " From the moment of conception the life of every human being is to be respected in an absolute way." Descriptions such as Bodin ' s make it clear that far from being respected absolutely, the embryos produced by IYF are valued only as a pool from which desirable candidates for reinsertion will be selected. And the phenomenon of spare embryos is not likely to go away, since each attempt at IYF is physically and emotionally trying for the woman, as well as expensive.
As might be expected, the killing of spare embryos is not taken seriously in descriptions of IYF. A recent Time magazine photo caption is typical: "Doctors have countered a virtual epidemic of infertility with new treatments, including the injection of sperm into eggs .. . The result: healthy fetuses like the four-month old one at left -and thousands of proud parents. ,, 23 That all of this has resulted in a general cheapening of human life is not surprising either. Those who use IYF seem unable to recognize any inherent values in their embryos outside of the trouble they have gone through to have them created . As one IYF client ponders the fate of her six frozen frozen e mbryos, she remarks, " After all we 've gone through , the concept of destroying the embryos is hard to imagine . So we pay o ur $50 a month sto rage fee, raise our boys and wo nder what we are going to do.,, 24 With heterologous artifi c ial fertili zation, additional problems can appear. A good example is Jaycee Buzzanca, a California two-year old who wa s legally parent less, despite th e fact that s ix different people could reasonably cl a im to be her parents . In 1994, Jo hn and Luanne Buzzanca arranged for IVF with anony mo us spe rm and egg do no rs. The embryo was implanted in the womb of a marri ed surrogate mother. Shortly before Jaycee was bo rn , John Buzzanca filed for divorce . In the meantime, the s urrogate mothe r decided to see k custody of the child, but later withdrew her claim . It is difficult to imagine a clearer example o f the ignorance o f Donum Vitae 's warnin g: " The child is not an object to which o ne has a right, no r can he be cons idered a s an o bj ect of ownership : rather, a child is a g ift.,,25 'n s uch cases of hete ro logo us arti ficia I ferti I izatio n, the eugen ic nature o f lYF is seen eve n mo re cl ea rl y. To facilitate egg do nation , egg ba nks prov id e fil es o n pros pecti ve do no rs, pote ntial recipie nts can select the o ne w ho appears most like ly to y ie ld healthy, attractive, and othe rw ise des ira ble o ffs prin g. Do no rs with mo re des ira bl e traits can rece ive a higher fee for their eggs .
Bad e ffec ts o n pare nts are a lso be ing noti ced . Jean Be nward , a psycholog ist who spec iali zes in infe rtility co un se ling, no tes that parents a re o fte n di stressed w he n they see th e features o f a nothe r woman o n the ir ba by ' s face. So me di scove r th at th ey think a bo ut th e egg donor lo ng a ft er the baby arrives. Others, says Be nward , are haunted by fanta s ies abo ut the ir Own bi o log ical o ffs prin g th at w ill neve r be bo rn . G ina Grammatico, a 23 y ear-o ld egg do no r, re ma rk s. " , didn ' t know w hat I was gettin g into . Ju st wonde rin g w hat th e child loo ks like is goin g to bug me fo r th e rest of my life."26 These difficulti es may be mo re commo n th an many reali ze : in 1994, I ,240 ba bi es we re bo rn fro m do nated eggs in th e US a lo ne . 27 And if the adults w ho o pt fo r th ese procedures are e nco unte rin g unto wa rd conseque nces, w hat w ill the futures o f th e ir childre n ho ld?
Conclusion
At prese nt , th e re is littl e indi cati o n that the tide of reproducti ve ma nipUlati o n w ill be stemmed. In a new procedure, e ig ht birth s ha ve now bee n re po rted a ft er fertili zatio n o f prev io us ly frozen eggs (as o pposed to th e froze n elllb,y o.\' normall y used in IVf) . If thi s tec hn o logy is pe rfected ( pe rhap s in a decade o r so), yo un g wo me n will be a bl e to ha ve th e ir eggs re moved a nd froze n, purs ue a ca ree r, a nd then have a c h i Id at w hatever age they decide to fit it into their schedule. Menopause will no longer mean the end of childbearing. In fact, with standard egg donation, approximately 100 women over age 50 have already given birth, including a 63 year-old American woman and a 62 year-old Italian. 28 As John Paris, SJ ., remarks in regard to these post-menopausal births, " We' re designing orphans by choice, and we say this is O.K.,, 29 Of course, the immo rality of IYF does not derive solely or even primarily from such consequences. IYF usurps God 's authority over the creation of human life by removing it from the context of the conjugal act. However, the growing circ us of reproductive technologies should serve as a reminder of what human beings find it rather difficult to learn: when we ignore divine wisdom, we do so to our own peril.
